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CLARIFYING NONPROFIT PURCHASE
RIGHTS IN AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Brandon M. Weiss*
Disputes around the country are proliferating as limited partner
investors attempt to thwart the ability of nonprofits to exercise
statutorily defined rights of first refusal to acquire low-income housing
tax credit developments upon the expiration of rent restrictions. Such
efforts, increasingly being made by “aggregator” investors, frustrate
congressional intent, violate long-held norms and expectations in the
industry, are costly for nonprofits to litigate, jeopardize the ongoing
affordability of an already scarce federally assisted housing stock, and
threaten to displace low-income tenants. This Essay describes the
problem, explores the collision of housing policy and tax policy that
gives rise to it, considers various conceptual approaches to resolution,
and provides specific policy recommendations using the Affordable
Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2019 as a point of departure. The
Essay argues that working with Congress to address this problem
should be a higher policy priority for the Biden Administration than
attempting to salvage former President Trump’s flawed Opportunity
Zone initiative.
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INTRODUCTION

Two important questions emerged during the excellent symposium
hosted by the Fordham Urban Law Journal in February 2021 on the
topic of A Taxing War on Poverty: Opportunity Zones and the Promise
of Investment and Economic Development. The final panel of the day
addressed the future of Opportunity Zones,1 former President Trump’s
primary economic development initiative, under the new Biden
Administration. Given the panoply of critiques that have been levied
at Opportunity Zones,2 the panel concluded the day by considering a
couple of key issues: 1) what else might the federal government do with
the billions of dollars in annual forgone tax revenue in lieu of providing
the Opportunity Zone incentives and 2) given scarce policymaking
bandwidth, what else might be a higher priority in the new
administration’s community development policy agenda than salvaging
this troubled Trump initiative. Elsewhere, I am writing on the former,
arguing that the foregone revenue would be better spent increasing
direct rental assistance to the lowest-income U.S. households.3 This

1. Congress created the Opportunity Zone program as part of the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017. See Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13823, 131 Stat. 2054, 2183 (codified at 26
U.S.C. §§ 1400Z-1, 1400Z-2). The program provides a variety of tax incentives to
taxpayers who invest capital gains in certain designated “low-income communities.”

See id.
2. See, e.g., Edward W. De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 82 (2020) (highlighting corruption in the designation of Opportunity Zones,
absence of use restrictions on eligible investments, and lack of community
participation). Much of the Fordham Urban Law Journal symposium centered on
considering critiques of the program.
3. See Brandon M. Weiss, Opportunity Zones, 1031 Exchanges, and Universal
Housing Vouchers, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (critiquing the Opportunity
Zone program as based on a flawed theoretical model and arguing that the value of
the tax incentives would be better directed toward low-income rental assistance).
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brief Essay considers the latter and offers one time-sensitive
alternative.
Unlike the Opportunity Zone program, which does not require the
provision of any particular goods or services,4 the federal Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)5 program has produced more than three
million units of generally high-quality affordable housing for lowincome households across the United States.6 While also no stranger
to critique,7 the program remains politically popular on a bipartisan
basis — Congress recently significantly increased the tax credit8 and is
currently considering legislation to do so again.9 Biden campaigned on
a promise to expand the credit “with a $10 billion investment.”10
LIHTC essentially is the only significant federal program that provides
annual support for the construction of new low-income housing. As a

4. See, e.g., Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based
Investment Tax Incentives and a Path Toward Community Oriented Reform, 2019
WIS. L. REV. 745, 770 (2019) (noting that businesses can claim Opportunity Zone
incentives without providing any specific local benefits).
5. Congress created the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085, 2189–208 (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 42). For a comparison of the LIHTC and Opportunity Zone
programs, see Tracy A. Kaye, Ogden Commons Case Study: A Comparative Look at
the LIHTC and OZ Tax Incentive Programs, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming Oct.
2021).
6. See Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB.
DEV., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html [https://perma.cc/9WPE6VF6] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021) (stating that the program created at least 3.23 million
housing units in 48,672 projects between 1987 and 2018).
7. Critiques have included that LIHTC is inefficient, fails to reach the lowestincome tenants without additional subsidy, can result in higher rent-burdens for
tenants than other federal housing programs, and fails to adequately locate housing in
high-opportunity neighborhoods. See, e.g., Katherine O’Regan & Keren Horn, What

Can We Learn About the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program by Looking at
the Tenants?, 23 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 597 (2013).
8. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 102, 131
Stat. 348, 1157 (increasing the amount of tax credits that states can allocate by 12.5%
for calendar years 2018 through 2021).
9. See Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2021, S. 1136, 117th Cong.
§ 101 (as introduced on Apr. 15, 2021); see also Dirk Wallace & Peter Lawrence, 2021

Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act Could Finance More than 2 Million
Additional Affordable Rental Homes over 10 Years, NOVOGRADAC (Apr. 15, 2021,
12:00
AM),
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/2021-affordablehousing-credit-improvement-act-could-finance-more-2-million-additional-affordable
[https://perma.cc/G2YF-MCHK] (noting that the bill would result in a 25% increase in
LIHTC authority in 2021 and 2022).
10. See The Biden Plan for Investing in our Communities Through Housing, BIDEN
HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/housing/ [https://perma.cc/A2ZY-GG9E] (last visited
Aug. 25, 2021).
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permanent tax credit created in 1986 that appears here to stay, it is
worth improving.
Unfortunately, as discussed herein, disputes are proliferating around
the country that threaten the ongoing affordability of LIHTC housing
of a particular type: namely, projects owned by nonprofit developers
that are nearing the end of their initial restricted use term.11 The
disputes center on limited partner investors in LIHTC projects
attempting to thwart the ability of nonprofit general partners to
exercise statutorily and contractually defined “rights of first refusal”
(ROFRs) to purchase a given project at the end of the initial
compliance period from the tax credit partnership at below-market
levels set by Congress. Such efforts by investors — described herein as
the “ROFR problem” — frustrate congressional intent, violate longheld norms and expectations in the industry, are costly for nonprofits
to litigate, jeopardize the ongoing affordability of an already scarce
federally assisted housing stock, and threaten to displace low-income
tenants. Investors use such efforts to, for example, pressure nonprofits
into buying them out at high prices or force lucrative sales of the
projects to third parties.12 The fact that these efforts are increasingly
being made by so-called “aggregators,”13 new investors not party to the
original partnership that purchase LIHTC interests nearing the end of
their initial rent-restricted terms, is all the more reason for alarm.
These disputes have begun to draw media coverage and broader
attention to the issue.14 In one high profile case in southern Florida not
far from Miami Beach, a nonprofit has spent $1.5 million litigating the
ROFR issue against HallKeen Management, a Massachusetts-based
investor that purchased Bank of America’s interests in a LIHTC
project for approximately $400,000 and then sought to force a sale to a
third party for $21 million.15 In another case involving a Brooklyn

11. See infra Section I.A. for a discussion of the relevant LIHTC timelines,
including the initial restricted use term.
12. See infra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Brandon Duong, Losing Nonprofit Control of Tax Credit Housing?,
SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 16, 2020), https://shelterforce.org/2020/10/16/refusing-the-rightto-refuse/?utm_source=sfweekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=101920
[https://perma.cc/LK9Q-HNBM] (describing the “rise of aggregators”). The term
“aggregator” presumably comes from their propensity to buy up many such interests.
14. See, e.g., Beth Healy & Christine Willmsen, Investors Mine for Profits in
Affordable Housing, Leaving Thousands of Tenants at Risk, WBUR (Apr. 29, 2021),
https://www.wbur.org/investigations/2021/04/29/investors-low-income-housingboston-south-end [https://perma.cc/D5DU-3RLP]; Duong, supra note 13.
15. See Opa-Locka Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. HK Aswan, LLC, No. 2019-16913-CA-01
(44), 2020 WL 4381624 *2–4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2020); see also Healy & Willmsen,
supra note 14.
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affordable housing complex in the gentrifying neighborhood of
Bushwick, New York State Attorney General Letitia James filed an
amicus brief in a ROFR dispute supporting the nonprofit developer
against SunAmerica Housing, an investor affiliate of American
International Group, Inc. (AIG).16 Such cases are likely to grow
significantly in number as, year after year, an increasing number of
LIHTC developments reach the end of their initial use restriction
periods.
Part I of this Essay provides relevant background on the LIHTC
program as outlined in Section 42 of the tax code, describes how the
ROFR problem arises within this legislative framework, and presents
a snapshot of the disputes unfolding around the United States. Part II
explores on a theoretical level how the problem emerges as a mismatch
between modern housing policy and tax policy: modern housing policy
attempting to leverage private sector involvement in the delivery of
low-income housing without sacrificing long-term affordability and tax
policy requiring that investors be “true owners” of real estate projects
in order to reap the tax incentives. This Part also considers several
varying conceptual approaches to resolving this mismatch. Part III
takes up the least disruptive and most politically palatable approach to
resolution — within the context of the current LIHTC framework —
and considers how the Biden Administration can work with Congress
to resolve the problem legislatively, using the Affordable Housing
Credit Improvement Act of 2019 as a point of departure. It also argues
that state housing finance agencies should amend their credit allocation

16. See Brief for State of New York and City of New York as Amici Curiae,
Riseboro Cmty. P’ship Inc. v. Sun America Hous. Fund 682, No. 20-4223 (2d. Cir. Apr.
14,
2021),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/riseboro_v._sunamerica_nys_and_nyc_amicus_brie
f_as_filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/54UX-9X28] (“The bottom line is that amici’s
significant investments in the LIHTC space would be threatened by profit-driven
entities taking ownership at the end of the tax credit period — or even just refusing to
leave without additional concessions. Such entities, unlike housing non-profits, have
no inherent commitment to preserving affordability. Should the widespread and
longstanding norm of long-term non-profit ownership be upended, this sea change
would jeopardize the benefits created by amici’s investments, enable for-profit
investors to reap financial returns from those public investments beyond what the
LIHTC program already generously provides, and undermine amici’s efforts to create
and preserve desperately needed affordable housing.” (citations omitted)); see also
Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Fights to Protect Affordable
Housing in New York (Apr. 15, 2021), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorneygeneral-james-fights-protect-affordable-housing-new-york [https://perma.cc/VA2CTAYX] (“For private investors to try and skew the terms of this affordable housing
program for their own financial gain is as harmful as it is unethical.”); Healy &
Willmsen, supra note 14.
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rules to ensure that tax credits flow to projects with strong nonprofit
purchase rights.
If the Biden Administration hopes to prioritize community
development policies that are certain to have an immediate and
positive impact on the lives of low-income U.S. households, it will place
the ROFR problem at the top of its policy agenda and work swiftly
with Congress to enact a legislative fix.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The LIHTC Framework

Congress created the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)
program as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.17 Successor to the
public housing program as the dominant means by which the federal
government provides financial assistance for the development of lowincome housing, the program is based on a model of leveraging private
sector equity and expertise.18 Elsewhere, I have described the
mechanics at length.19 For relevant purposes here, a typical transaction
involves a real estate developer applying to a state housing finance
agency for an award of federal tax credits. If the application is
successful, the developer generally enters into a limited partnership as
the general partner with a private investor limited partner — usually a
bank or other large financial institution with the annual tax liability to
make the nonrefundable credits of value.20 The limited partner
investor provides the equity needed to build a new affordable housing
development and, in exchange, the partnership allocates the lion’s
share of the tax credits, depreciation deductions, and other tax benefits

17. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085, 2189–208 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 42).
18. The federal government experimented with a number of other programs to
subsidize the development of low-income housing prior to arriving at the LIHTC
model. See generally Charles L. Edson, Affordable Housing — An Intimate History,
20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 193 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Brandon M. Weiss, Residual Value Capture in Subsidized Housing,
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 521 (2016) (detailing the mechanics of the LIHTC program
and arguing for a nonprofit developer preference in original LIHTC allocations).
20. See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LOW-INCOME HOUSING
TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR BANKS 6–9
(2014),
https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/communityaffairs/community-developments-insights/pub-insights-mar-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PL7C-X6YE].
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to the investor. These benefits alone typically provide the investor with
a healthy return on investment.21
Relevant timeframes are key to understanding the ROFR problem.
Section 42 of the tax code provides that investors claim the tax credits
annually for ten years.22 LIHTC housing is subject to certain incomeeligibility requirements and rent limits for an initial 15-year compliance
period23 and, for projects starting in 1990, an additional 15-year
extended use period.24 For the first 15 years, the tax credits are subject
to recapture by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) if, for example, the
developer violates the rent or income restrictions or if the project falls
into serious physical or financial distress.25 After the first 15 years, tax
credit recapture by the IRS is off the table and state housing agencies
are primarily responsible for programmatic enforcement.
Both for-profit and nonprofit developers are eligible to apply to
state housing finance agencies for an award of LIHTCs. In addition to
other benefits,26 nonprofits generally are much more likely than forprofits to maintain rents at below-market levels even beyond the

21. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT INVESTMENT
SURVEY 6 (2009), https://www.nahma.org/wp-content/uploads/files/member/Tax%20
Credit/Legislative%20Study_FINAL%20092509.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3BZ-HSDM]
(noting average annual after-tax internal rates of return of approximately 10%);
COHNREZNICK LLP, HOUSING TAX CREDIT INVESTMENTS: INVESTMENT AND
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 24 (2018) (noting that on a weighted average basis,
actual yields have exceeded projected yields since 2000). Note that in addition to the
financial benefits of LIHTC investments, banks that invest in LIHTC also receive
valuable regulatory credit under the Community Reinvestment Act. Id. at 15 (“Banks
are obligated, under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) regulations, to make
loans, provide services, and make investments in low- to moderate-income
neighborhoods in those areas in which they take deposits. . . . The strong financial
performance track record of housing tax credit investments has historically been an
ideal match for bank investors with a conservative focus. There are a limited number
of qualified equity investments under CRA regulations, and many of these have less
attractive yield and/or risk profiles than housing credit investments. Among the
available investment options, housing credit investments appear to be a clear investor
favorite.”).
22. 26 U.S.C. § 42(b)(1)(B).
23. Id. § 42(i)(1).
24. Id. § 42(h)(6)(D); see also What Happens to LIHTC Properties After
Affordability Requirements Expire?, HUD USER, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/
pdredge/pdr_edge_research_081712.html [https://perma.cc/4PW5-FSDH] (last visited
Sept. 3, 2021).
25. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(j).
26. Nonprofit-developed affordable housing has been found to be more likely to
provide the deepest levels of affordability, provide on-site social services for special
needs, include larger units for families, and have other positive spillover effects on a
neighborhood. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 552.
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expiration of legally required restrictions.27 As such, Section 42
requires that states award at least 10% of their tax credits to projects
that involve nonprofit developers, though states may exceed that
floor.28
B. The ROFR Provision

Hoping to promote long-term affordability, Congress included a
provision in Section 42 to facilitate the ability of nonprofit developers
to buy out the limited partner investor after the initial 15-year
compliance period. 29 The provision, Section 42(i)(7), is structured as
a safe harbor — it ensures that none of the tax credits allocated to the
investor will be disallowed by the IRS as the result of a qualified taxexempt nonprofit holding a below-market “right of first refusal” to
purchase the property after the initial 15-year compliance period.30 In
a typical real estate transaction, a “right of first refusal” grants the
holder the right to purchase the property if the holder is willing to
match the price of a third-party offer. However, in this case, the tax

27. See OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RSCH., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
MULTIFAMILY PROPERTIES: OPTING IN, OPTING OUT AND REMAINING AFFORDABLE
ix (2006) (analyzing HUD data related to HUD-subsidized housing and noting, “As
expected, nonprofit owners were much less likely to opt out [of the subsidy program]
compared with for-profit owners. Nonprofit owners are often mission-driven to
continue to provide affordable housing”); see also OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RSCH., U.S.
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WHAT HAPPENS TO LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT PROPERTIES AT YEAR 15 AND BEYOND 7 (2012) [hereinafter HUD Y15
REPORT] (“Other factors also affect whether LIHTC properties will be repositioned to
market rate. Many developments have socially motivated sponsors, often nonprofits
whose mission is to create and preserve affordable housing in their neighborhoods.
Even if no additional affordability restrictions prevent these organizations from
converting properties to market rate, they typically maintain the units’ affordability to
achieve their mission.”).
28. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(5).
29. See Homeowner’s Rehab, Inc. v. Related Corp. V SLP, L.P., 99 N.E.3d 744, 756
(Mass. 2018) (“The legislative history of § 42(i)(7) confirms that it was intended to
facilitate the inexpensive transfer of properties to nonprofit organizations. . . .
Lawmakers were concerned that properties financed under the LIHTC program would
not remain affordable in the long term, because their owners would convert them to
market-rate housing — or sell them to third parties who would — as soon as the
affordability restrictions were lifted. . . . Their proposed solution was to make it easier
for nonprofit organizations to purchase the properties.” (citations omitted)).
30. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(i)(7)(A) (“No Federal income tax benefit shall fail to be
allowable to the taxpayer with respect to any qualified low-income building merely by
reason of a right of 1st refusal held by the tenants (in cooperative form or otherwise)
or resident management corporation of such building or by a qualified nonprofit
organization (as defined in subsection (h)(5)(C)) or government agency to purchase
the property after the close of the compliance period for a price which is not less than
the minimum purchase price determined under subparagraph (B).”).
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code defines ex ante the price at which the nonprofit will purchase the
project upon the exercise of a Section 42 ROFR: essentially, the
outstanding debt on the property plus any “exit taxes” that result from
the sale — a price often referred to as “debt plus taxes.”31 As a safe
harbor, the provision does not require that LIHTC partnerships grant
nonprofit general partner developers a ROFR. Rather, the provision
simply ensures that if a nonprofit successfully bargains for a belowmarket ROFR in the context of a LIHTC deal, other principles of tax
law, discussed in Part II infra, will not operate to disallow the claiming
of LIHTCs by the investor.
Notwithstanding the non-mandatory safe harbor nature of the
provision, as the LIHTC industry matured in the years following the
credit’s creation in the 1986 tax overhaul, ROFRs drafted pursuant to
Section 42(i)(7) became a standard feature of LIHTC deals involving
nonprofit developers.32 Investors viewed the tax credits, claimed over
the first ten years, as their primary economic incentive for doing these
deals.33 By the end of the initial 15-year compliance period, all credits
have been claimed and IRS recapture is no longer a threat.34 Analysis
of investor prospectus documents forecasting expected profits in
nonprofit-developed LIHTC deals reveal that investors historically did
not assume significant gains from the sale of the property at the end of
the initial compliance period.35 The general expectation was that
investors would happily exit the partnership so long as any tax liability
incurred from the exit was covered.

31. See id. § 42(i)(7)(B).
32. See WASH. STATE HOUS. FIN. COMM’N, NONPROFIT TRANSFER DISPUTES IN THE
LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: AN EMERGING THREAT TO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 4 (2019) [hereinafter WSHFC REPORT] (“This nonprofit right
of first refusal . . . is an important component of the program that has facilitated
nonprofit ownership of many LIHTC projects. As a matter of industry practice,
nonprofit partners have commonly secured this right in their LIHTC partnership
agreements, sometimes supplemented with other transfer rights the parties have
negotiated. Investors have consistently agreed to this arrangement at the outset
because they generally foresee ‘little economic motivation to stay’ after all tax credits
have been claimed from the project, and prefer to avoid ‘administrative burdens’ and
related project costs many years into the future.” (citations omitted)).
33. Id.
34. See supra notes 22, 25, and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 4 (“For decades, the widespread expectation and practice has been that
the nonprofit partners will secure ownership of LIHTC projects as a matter of course
after the 15-year compliance period, usually by exercising the statutory ROFR at the
specified minimum price. In most deals, the original financial projections will confirm
that ultimate transfer to the nonprofit partner at the statutory ROFR price was the
operating assumption of all parties.”).
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For many years, the program operated according to this expectation
with projects regularly transferred to nonprofits pursuant to Section 42
ROFRs.36 By one estimate contained in a 2012 report by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 95% of such
properties were transferred to the original nonprofit developer postinitial compliance period.37
C. The Proliferation of Disputes

Over the last several years, however, a new trend in the field has
emerged, leading to burgeoning disputes around the country. As a
growing number of LIHTC developments have reached the end of
their initial compliance period, various financial entities began to see
an opportunity at this critical moment in the life of the project to
extract value. In some instances, these entities are the original investor
limited partner.38 But in an increasing number of cases, new investors,
sometimes referred to as “aggregators,” buy out original investor
limited partner interests in nonprofit-developed LIHTC partnerships
with projects approaching year 15.39 Investors in these disputes use a
variety of tactics to pressure nonprofits40 — for example, refusing to
consent to applications for financing to conduct necessary capital

36. See HUD Y15 REPORT, supra note 27, at xiii (“By far the most common pattern
of ownership change around Year 15 is for the LPs to sell their interests in the property
to the general partner (GP) (or its affiliate or subsidiary) and for the GP to continue
to own and operate the property. This pattern is overwhelmingly the case for
properties with nonprofit developers.”).
37. Id. at 29.
38. See WSHFC REPORT, supra note 32, at 1.
39. See David Davenport, Year 15: Facing off with the Aggregator — Newcomers
Try to Toss Partnership Intent Out the Window, in TAX CREDIT ADVISOR 27, 27 (2019)
(“An aggregator — unlike a typical syndicator or investor that developers have worked
with for years — is someone new to the general partner, who was not part of the initial
transaction that led to the LIHTC partnership or affordable housing development, and
who may view the partnership and its development as a financial instrument rather
than an affordable housing real estate investment. As a result, once the development
reaches the end of the compliance period, the aggregator aggressively may seek to
dispose of the limited partner’s interest in the project partnership or company to
achieve a cash windfall inconsistent with the original tax credit investor’s (and the real
estate developer’s) intentions and expectations . . . .”).
40. See WSHFC REPORT, supra note 32, at 5 (“These include disputing the
conditions and scope of transfer rights; delaying, obstructing, and disagreeing with
related valuations; refusing consent to refinancing, either outright or by placing
significant conditions on consent; disputing fee calculations; arguing over
typographical errors; and asserting alleged breaches of partnership duties from many
years prior, including by arguing that rents should have been set higher to maximize
profits.”).
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improvements.41 Frequently, investors seek a payment in exchange for
their exit from the partnership.42 An alternative approach is to insist
on a sale to a third party.43 Other efforts focus on removing the
nonprofit general partner from the partnership, for example, via claims
of breach of fiduciary duties.44 With control of the project, an investor
can attempt to eliminate the extended rent and income restrictions on
the property through a technical procedure known as the “qualified
contract” process.45 Alternatively, investors can simply wait until the
extended use restrictions expire and convert the property to marketrate use or sell to a third party that sees long-term upside value.
In all cases where a nonprofit holds a Section 42 ROFR, these
various investor efforts can only succeed if the nonprofit cannot
successfully acquire the property pursuant to the ROFR. Resourceconstrained nonprofits often find themselves unable to challenge
investor practices or enforce their rights under a ROFR in court.46 Yet,

41. See NAT’L HOUS. TR., WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN INVESTOR REFUSES TO
RECOGNIZE THE NONPROFIT RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL 1 (2021) (noting that “[i]n a
typical ROFR dispute, the prudent management of the affordable housing property is
essentially frozen as the investor refuses to permit the general partner to undertake
necessary capital improvements” and explaining how such disputes can lead to
deteriorating property conditions, curtailed resident services, and an overall shorter
useful life for the project).
42. See WSHFC REPORT, supra note 32, at 6; see also NAT’L HOUS. TR., supra note
41, at 2 (noting that, depending on the source of funds, such payments can have a
variety of detrimental impacts, including reduced project reserves, increased property
rents, additional debt on the property, or a significantly reduced balance sheet for the
nonprofit).
43. See NAT’L HOUS. TR., supra note 41, at 2.
44. Compare Senior Hous. Assistance Grp. v. Amtax Holdings 260, LLC, No. C171115RSM, 2019 WL 687837, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2019) (rejecting the investor’s
claim that the nonprofit general partner should be removed from the partnership for
breaching its fiduciary duty by soliciting third-party offers in an attempt to trigger its
ROFR), with SunAmerica Hous. Fund 1050 v. Pathway of Pontiac, Inc., No. 19-11783,
2021 WL 391420, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2021) (holding that the nonprofit general
partner violated its fiduciary duties “by attempting to effectuate a transfer of the
Property . . . for a below market value against the interest of the Plaintiff and the
Partnership”).
45. See HUD Y15 REPORT, supra note 27, at 38–39 (describing the qualified
contract process by which an owner can seek regulatory relief from the extended use
restrictions). Free from the rent restrictions, investors can seek to raise rent levels
significantly to market levels — a particularly appealing strategy in already expensive
or gentrifying neighborhoods. State-specific policies may limit an investor’s ability to
use the qualified contract process. Note that program rules protect tenants from
eviction for a three-year period following termination of the rent restrictions via the
qualified contract process. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(E)(ii).
46. See WSHFC REPORT, supra note 32, at 6 (“Though some nonprofits fight back,
many lack the resources or will to do so . . . . Based on the sheer volume of litigation
alone to date, it is obvious that substantial revenues have already been diverted from
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in a number of cases around the country — in states including Florida,47
Washington,48 Massachusetts,49 New York,50 Michigan,51 and in what
appears to be a rapidly expanding list52 — litigation has emerged in
recent years over the exercise of Section 42 ROFRs.53
While a comprehensive review of the litigation is beyond the scope
of this Essay, the cases generally revolve around disagreements as to
the requisite conditions precedent that must be satisfied for a nonprofit
to exercise its purchase rights under Section 42(i)(7). Two key and
related issues are central to these arguments: 1) whether the consent of
the partnership and/or investor limited partner to sell the property is
necessary for the nonprofit to exercise its ROFR and 2) whether a bona
fide third-party offer is necessary to trigger the ROFR.54 These
inquiries often take the form of considering whether the ROFR
defined in Section 42 should be interpreted under state common law,
which typically requires a willingness to sell by the owner and a bona
fide arm’s-length third-party offer to trigger the exercise of a ROFR.55
The investor limited partners in these cases argue that Congress’s
choice of the term “right of first refusal” in Section 42 is clear and
means conclusively that common law principles should be used in
nonprofits and LIHTC projects. When transfers to nonprofits are systematically
thwarted, or nonprofits are drained of resources that would otherwise go into these
projects, the LIHTC program suffers and its goals are undermined.” (citations
omitted)).
47. See Opa-Locka Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. HK Aswan, LLC, No. 2019-16913-CA-01
(44), 2020 WL 4381624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2020).
48. See Senior Hous. Assistance Grp., 2019 WL 687837, at *2–3.
49. See Homeowner’s Rehab, Inc. v. Related Corp. V SLP, L.P., 99 N.E.3d 744
(Mass. 2018).
50. See Riseboro Cmty. P’ship Inc. v. SunAmerica Hous. Fund 682, 482 F. Supp. 3d
31 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).
51. See SunAmerica Hous. Fund 1050 v. Pathway of Pontiac, Inc., No. 19-11783,
2021 WL 391420 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2021).
52. See Davenport, supra note 39 (noting that the author, a trial lawyer who
represents general partners in “LIHTC disputes nearing or at the end of the
compliance period,” now represents more than 60 clients in 12 states).
53. The number of informal disputes likely far exceeds the number of disputes that
reach formal litigation.
54. See, e.g., Riseboro Cmty. P’ship, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (“Defendants counter
that Riseboro may exercise its ROFR to purchase the Apartment Complex only after
two conditions precedent are satisfied: the Partnership must be willing to sell and a
third-party must have made a bona-fide offer to buy.”).
55. See, e.g., Homeowner’s Rehab, Inc. v. Related Corp. V SLP, L.P., 99 N.E.3d
744, 754–55 (Mass. 2018) (“At common law, . . . a right of first refusal cannot be
exercised unilaterally, but can only be exercised where two conditions are met. First,
the right of first refusal must be triggered by ‘a bona fide and enforceable offer to
purchase’ the property . . . . Second, the owner of the property must have decided to
accept that third-party offer.” (citations omitted)).
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interpreting Section 42 ROFRs.56 These are not purchase options,
which typically would give a party a right to purchase regardless of the
owner’s desire to sell and without the need for a triggering third-party
offer.57 Rather, investors argue, these are classic rights of first refusal,
requiring owner willingness to sell and a bona fide third-party offer.
Alternatively, nonprofits argue that Section 42 ROFRs cannot
possibly be interpreted as common law ROFRs because of a key
feature in Section 42: namely, the below-market “debt plus taxes”
purchase price defined by Congress in the tax code.58 A typical
common law ROFR does not have a pre-set purchase price — as
described above, a traditional ROFR allows the holder to match a price
offered by a third party.59 In setting a predetermined below-market
purchase price, Congress thus could not have intended this mechanism
to operate as a common law ROFR. After all, as one court reasoned
in a decision favorable to a nonprofit, what unrelated third party would
go to the expense of putting together a bona fide offer on a property if
it knew that such offer would trigger a nonprofit’s right to purchase the
property at a below-market price?60 Given Congress’s intent to use
Section 42(i)(7) as a mechanism to preserve the long-term affordability
of this housing stock, surely Congress would not have granted a ROFR
that in practice would never be exercised. As such, nonprofits in these
cases argue that a bona fide third-party offer must not be a
requirement.61 Furthermore, they argue that investor consent to sell is

56. See, e.g., Senior Hous. Assistance Grp. v. Amtax Holdings 260, LLC, No. C171115RSM, 2019 WL 687837, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2019) (holding for the investor
that “the term right of first refusal is not ambiguous or open to interpretation. This
term is precisely defined in both standard and legal dictionaries and has a specific clear
meaning in a contract concerning real estate”).
57. See, e.g., Riseboro Cmty. P’ship., 482 F. Supp. 3d at 37 (“A ROFR stands in
contrast to an ‘option’ to purchase, which may be triggered unilaterally, even against
the owner’s unwillingness to sell at the time the option-holder invokes the option.”
(citations omitted)).
58. See, e.g., Opa-Locka Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. HK Aswan, LLC, No. 2019-16913CA-01 (44), 2020 WL 4381624, at *9–10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2020) (“Put simply, these
below-market, ‘minimum purchase price’ rights of first refusal only exist[] because
Section 42(i)(7) exists. Accordingly, . . . Defendants’ argument ‘fails to acknowledge’
that a Section 42 ROFR, such as the ROFR here, ‘is not purely a creation of the
common law’ but is granted pursuant to Section 42 and must therefore be interpreted
in light of Section 42.” (citations omitted)).
59. See, e.g., Homeowner’s Rehab, 99 N.E.3d at 755 (“[A] right of first refusal is
only a preemptive right, prohibiting the owner from selling the property to a third party
‘without first offering the property to the holder . . . at the third party’s offering price.’”
(citations omitted)).
60. Id. at 758.
61. See, e.g., Opa-Locka Cmty. Dev. Corp., 2020 WL 4381624, at *6.
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either not required or is a matter of parsing the specific language of the
relevant limited partnership agreement.62
Thus far, the courts collectively have rendered a relatively split
decision on these cases. In Massachusetts and Florida, state courts
have sided with the nonprofits attempting to exercise their ROFR
rights. In federal courts in Washington, New York, and Michigan,
nonprofits have lost on these issues. As this litigation spreads around
the country, courts are likely to continue to reach differing conclusions.
II. HOUSING POLICY AND TAX POLICY MISMATCH
A. Evolving Housing Policy

In considering how best to resolve the ROFR problem, it is helpful
to zoom out from the weeds of this litigation and evaluate more
theoretically how we arrived here. The LIHTC program emerged in a
political climate that viewed public housing as a flawed federal
program. National housing policy sought to elevate the role of the
private sector in the provision of subsidized housing.63 The goal was to
leverage the discipline and acumen of the private sector in
underwriting, developing, and managing the low-income housing
stock. The LIHTC structure does this, in part, by ensuring that
sophisticated financial entities have a vested interest in a project’s
success. The recapture provisions are key in this regard — with
millions of dollars of tax credits at stake, the investor limited partner is
highly motivated to ensure that the project is successful. Proponents
of the privatized LIHTC model think of investor limited partners as
playing something of a quality control role.
Yet, as profit-motivated entities, investors are only motivated to
play this role to the extent that it aligns with their financial goals.
Preserving long-term affordability beyond the expiration of the

62. See Homeowner’s Rehab, Inc., 99 N.E.3d at 761 (“In reaching this conclusion
[that investor consent is not required], we emphasize that we are only interpreting the
language of the agreements that the parties executed here.”).
63. Other prior privatized approaches, including the Section 221(d)(3) BMIR,
Section 236, and Project-Based Section 8 programs, enlisted private for-profit
developers but lacked the investor feature of LIHTC. See generally James Grow &
Brandon Weiss, Preservation of Affordable Housing, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 411 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2d
ed. 2011) (describing the mechanics of these programs). As rent restrictions expired,
housing developed by these programs ran into many of the same sort of expiring use
challenges as described in this Essay regarding the LIHTC stock. See id. at 412 (“The
time-limited nature of the mortgage and associated regulatory agreement thus planted
the seed for a substantial expiring use problem to sprout decades later.”).
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requisite use restrictions, particularly once all tax credits have been
claimed and are beyond the reach of recapture, does not align with
those goals. Nonprofit developers, by contrast, regularly make it a part
of their mission to preserve long-term affordability. Often such efforts
involve applying for a new round of tax credits and “resyndicating” the
project to a new investor.
A preferable institutional arrangement from a public policy
perspective thus would leverage private sector underwriting and
oversight, while placing long-term control in the hands of missiondriven nonprofits or other public-oriented stakeholders. Most notable
about this arrangement is that nothing inherently requires the private
sector stakeholder to hold an actual ownership interest in the project.
Rather, if it were possible simply to contract with the private sector to
provide certain technical expertise, perhaps with various performance
metrics and incentives, this would avoid thorny backend issues that
jeopardize the long-term public value of a project.
B. A Collision with Tax Policy

For political reasons unrelated to housing policy, however, Congress
has chosen to run our primary low-income housing program through
the tax code rather than fund it via direct appropriations.64 One
advantage of this choice is that, as a permanent tax credit, it is available
to all states every year without the need for congressional negotiations
over funding levels. Yet, the decision also brings with it a set of
structural constraints that, while serving tax policy, do not serve any
appreciable housing policy.
Basic tax principles require that in order to claim the tax benefits of
the kind that make LIHTC investments valuable, the tax credit
partnership must be a true owner of the project.65 Furthermore, simply
holding bare legal title is insufficient to claim the incidents of taxation
that accompany property ownership.66 Rather, tax law considers
whether a taxpayer holds the “benefits and burdens” of ownership in
determining whether, for example, tax credits and valuable

64. See, e.g., Blaine G. Saito, Collaborative Governance and the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit, 39 VA. TAX REV. 451, 505–07 (2020) (describing how the structure
of LIHTC as a tax credit rather than a grant program appeals to both smallgovernment conservatives and liberals who want to help the poor, streamlines the
congressional committees with oversight, and eliminates the need for annual
reauthorization).
65. See 2 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 17:5 (2021).
66. Id.
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depreciation deductions can be claimed by a given taxpayer.67 One
such benefit courts have considered in determining if a taxpayer is a
true owner is whether the taxpayer holds the right to the appreciation
of a property, which would weigh in favor of a finding of true
ownership.68
Congress, or at a minimum congressional staff, appears to have been
sensitive to these tax principles in drafting the ROFR provision, which
was included in an early amendment to the LIHTC statute in the late
1980s. A task force of housing experts convened by Senators George
Mitchell and John Danforth originally recommended a stronger safe
harbor — that tax credit partnerships could grant nonprofit
organizations and tenant cooperatives below-market purchase options
without jeopardizing true ownership or the ability of investors to claim
tax credits.69 This recommendation was included in a bill that was
introduced in the Senate in 1989.70 However, below-market purchase
options had been viewed in other contexts as a substantial
relinquishment of one of the key benefits of ownership — namely, the
right to the appreciation of a property — such that in certain cases the
granting of a purchase option might jeopardize true ownership and the
ability to claim the associated tax benefits.71 In an effort to harmonize
Section 42 as much as possible with general tax principles, Congress
ultimately settled on the weaker mechanism of a ROFR in creating the
Section 42(i)(7) safe harbor. Notwithstanding the shift away from a
purchase option, Congress apparently still deemed it worthwhile to
include the safe harbor to protect against any argument that even the
granting of a ROFR with a below-market purchase price might
otherwise jeopardize true ownership and the ability to claim tax credits.
In making this switch, Congress struck a compromise. The safe
harbor deviated less from general tax principles, ensuring that the tax
credit partnership did not too significantly relinquish one of the key
indicia of property ownership. At the same time, the ROFR safe
harbor theoretically provided a mechanism for keeping long-term
control in the hands of public-oriented stewards. Unfortunately, the

67. Id.
68. See Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit, 38 VILL. L. REV. 871, 890 (1993).
69. See REPORT OF THE MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE ON THE LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT 19 (1989) (“Non-profit organizations and tenant cooperatives
should be able to negotiate below-market purchase options during a project’s initial
development and financing without disqualifying investors from claiming the [c]redit
while they own the project.”).
70. See S. 980, 101st Cong. § 2(y) (1989).
71. See Kaye, supra note 68, at 892.
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conferral of a ROFR with a below-market purchase price, rather than
a pure purchase option, muddied the waters with respect to the
necessary conditions required for a nonprofit to acquire the property
— hence the proliferation of disputes described above. This lack of
clarity, along with the failure of the IRS to issue any clarifying guidance
on the ROFR issue, left the field ripe for exploitation by profit-driven
entities, frustrating the congressional intent of preserving long-term
affordability.
C. Theoretical Approaches to Resolving the Mismatch

At a broad conceptual level, there are several potential theoretical
approaches to resolving this collision of housing policy and tax policy.
The most straightforward one would be to subsidize the construction
of low-income housing through a more direct mechanism than the tax
code — namely, via direct appropriations. It is an odd feature of U.S.
housing policy that the primary federal low-income housing
construction program is administered under the auspices of the U.S.
Department of Treasury and, more specifically, the IRS, rather than
HUD.72 Notwithstanding some perception of public housing as a
troubled government program, the program continues to provide
critical affordable housing to approximately one million of the lowestincome households.73 Many of the program’s problems stemmed from
the racially discriminatory manner in which the program was originally
implemented.74 With adequate federal funding and taking account of
lessons learned from nearly a century of experimentation with federal
efforts to subsidize low-income housing, perhaps a newly expanded
public housing program, for which some are advocating,75 could be

72. See Saito, supra note 64, at 484 (“But as LIHTC is currently constructed, HUD
plays a limited role. HUD is not given any significant management or administration
role in the Code and regulations.”).
73. See HUD’s Public Housing Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog [https://perma.cc/2TAZ-LYRY]
(last visited Aug. 23, 2021) (placing the current estimate at approximately 970,000
households).
74. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY
OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 17–37 (2017) (recounting the
history and effects of officially sanctioned racial segregation in public housing).
75. See, e.g., PolicyLink, A Bolder Future for Housing Justice: ‘These Times Call
for
Radical
Actions,’
SHELTERFORCE
(Jan.
15,
2021),
https://shelterforce.org/2021/01/15/imagining-a-bolder-future-for-housing-justice/
[https://perma.cc/SU3K-MMY8] (interviewing Tara Raghuveer, the Homes
Guarantee campaign director at People’s Action, about the campaign’s call for “12
million new units of social housing, which is housing that’s permanently off of the
private market, not available for speculation”).
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designed to address the perceived shortcomings that provided the
original impetus for the transition to our current privatized model.
Alternatively, staying within the confines of the tax code, one could
imagine a tax credit that eliminates the central role of investors in
determining the long-term fate of a project. For example, were the
LIHTC program converted into a refundable tax credit, nonprofit
developers could dispense with investors entirely and directly invest
the proceeds of the tax credits in low-income housing. This strategy
has the benefit of placing long-term control of the housing squarely in
the hands of entities that are more likely to preserve long-term
affordability.
This general sort of approach would not be
unprecedented. At the height of the Great Recession, during a period
of concern that investor equity for tax credits would dry up, Congress
allowed state housing agencies to exchange LIHTCs for federal funds
that could be used to make grants and loans directly to developers that
had previously been awarded tax credits.76
Of course, both of the above approaches face significant practical
challenges. As described above, political considerations are what led
to the emergence of the LIHTC model and such considerations remain
forceful. In addition, these approaches would not satisfy those who
view the model of leveraging investor involvement as a virtue rather
than a vice. In the short term, the least disruptive and most realistic
solution to the ROFR problem is through more modest amendments
to the current LIHTC framework.
III. ADDRESSING THE ROFR PROBLEM
A. Federal Level

Particularly notable about the inclusion of a ROFR rather than a
purchase option in Section 42(i)(7) is that the choice was made for no
housing policy purpose. Yet, the distinction ultimately may carry
significant housing policy implications with respect to long-term
control of the LIHTC housing stock, depending on how the ROFR
litigation unfolds. Equally notable is the fact that Congress faced no
actual legal obstacle to employing a pure purchase option rather than
a ROFR with a below-market market purchase price. Recall that

76. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §
1602, 123 Stat. 115, 362 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 42 note); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-66, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AGENCIES
IMPLEMENTED CHANGES ENACTED IN 2008, BUT PROJECT DATA COLLECTION COULD
BE
IMPROVED
10–11
(2012),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-66.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4AA-BVQ6] (describing the mechanics of the exchange program).
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42(i)(7) is a provision by which Congress provides a safe harbor to
protect the ability to claim tax credits against otherwise applicable
general tax principles. Congress creates tax law and can determine
when general tax policy principles are relevant.77 In other aspects of
the LIHTC program, Congress has departed from general tax
principles — for example, in acknowledging that, unlike as required in
a typical real estate transaction, investors in LIHTC deals would not
engage in the transaction but for the tax benefits.78
Congress could have included a purchase option in the Section
42(i)(7) safe harbor rather than a ROFR. This might have accorded
less with general tax policy principles — it would allow investors to
claim tax credits even where their right to the appreciation of the
property is more limited from the outset. Yet, the choice would have
provided a tax credit more finely calibrated to achieving congressional
intent: namely, preserving the long-term affordability of LIHTC
housing.
Fortunately, it is not too late to amend the tax code and efforts are
afoot to do so. Section 303 of the draft Affordable Housing Credit
Improvement Act (AHCIA) of 2019 included language that would
have amended Section 42(i)(7) to strike the term “a right of first
refusal” and instead insert “an option” — a broader term apparently
intended to cover both pure purchase options and ROFRs with belowmarket purchase prices.79 The draft also included new language that
would extend safe harbor protection to ROFRs that “may be exercised
with or without the approval of the taxpayer” and “in response to any

77. For a similar point, see Multiple Affordable Housing Organizations Respond
to Right-of-First-Refusal Blog, NOVOGRADAC, https://www.novoco.com/multipleaffordable-housing-organizations-respond-right-first-refusal-blog
[https://perma.cc/UY9Y-K279] (last visited Aug. 23, 2021) (in which a number of
national organizations, including the National Housing Law Project and the National
Low Income Housing Coalition, state: “Regardless of general tax policy principles,
Congress has the authority to determine what the tax law is and in section 42(i)(7), as
currently existing or as amended by section 303, it can provide who receives the tax
benefits notwithstanding the existence of a below-market purchase option”).
78. See Forrest David Milder, What Does Codification of the “Economic
Substance Doctrine” Mean for Tax Credit Transactions, NIXON PEABODY (Apr. 21,
2010),
https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2010/04/21/what-doescodification-of-the-economic-substance-doctrine-mean-for-tax-credit-transacti
[https://perma.cc/L7PB-UQXY] (noting an exception for tax credits like LIHTC
described in a technical explanation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and
concluding that “it appears that transactions that feature the typical tax credits will
generally not be subjected to economic substance analysis”).
79. See Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2019, S. 1703, 116th Cong.
§ 303 (as introduced on June 4, 2019).
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offer to purchase the property, including an offer by a related party.”80
The Act stated explicitly that none of the amendments would
supersede the terms of a preexisting option or ROFR agreement,81
though some commentators expressed concern that this was not
entirely clear.82 While Senator Maria Cantwell introduced the bill in
June of 2019, the proposed legislation never advanced out of the
Senate Finance Committee.
Advocates continue to lobby for a legislative fix to the ROFR
problem. Senator Cantwell recently reintroduced a modified version
of the Act as the Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of
2021.83 Unfortunately, former Section 303 that included the provisions
relevant to the ROFR problem was not included in this version, likely
given intense lobbying by interests sympathetic to investors.
Conversations continue about introducing a separate bill that would
address the ROFR problem.84
Such a bill should improve upon what was contained in the AHCIA
of 2019. Prospectively, for future LIHTC deals, Congress should
strengthen the language to make clear that safe harbor protection
would be extended only where a nonprofit is granted a pure purchase
option at a below-market “debt plus taxes” price.85 While it is
theoretically conceivable that this could make some investors hesitant
to negotiate for any purchase rights in future deals, the investor market
for tax credits is highly competitive.86 This amendment would function
80. Id. § 303(b)(3).
81. Id. § 303(c)(3).
82. See Dirk Wallace & Michael Novogradac, Congress Considering Retroactive
Changes Affecting Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Property Owners, Part I,
NOVOGRADAC (July 24, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/notes-fromnovogradac/congress-considering-retroactive-changes-affecting-low-income-housingtax-credit-property-owners [https://perma.cc/TA34-DQJB].
83. See Press Release, U.S. Sen. Maria Cantwell, New Cantwell, DelBene
Legislation Would Build Millions of New Affordable Housing Units Nationwide, Tens
of
Thousands
in
Washington
(Apr.
15,
2021),
https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/press-releases/new-cantwell-delbenelegislation-would-build-millions-of-new-affordable-housing-units-nationwide-tens-ofthousands-in-washington [https://perma.cc/48GW-C8V9].
84. Adam Carasso, Senior Tax and Econ. Adviser at Senate Fin. Comm.,
Comments to the National Preservation Working Group (July 19, 2021) (discussing
efforts by Senator Ron Wyden to draft a new bill that, among other provisions, would
address the ROFR problem).
85. The preservation ends of Congress would be even further served by changing
this minimum purchase price simply to the assumption of project debt, with the
investor being responsible for any exit taxes. Senator Wyden’s draft legislation
referenced supra note 84 reportedly takes this approach.
86. Research has found that the demand for LIHTCs outpaces supply in all 50
states, with some states seeing ratios as high as 5:1 comparing applications for total
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upfront to filter out investors unwilling to clearly agree to transfer
control after the expiration of the initial use restriction period.87 Such
an amendment would channel the industry toward using a mechanism:
1) for which the requirements of execution are clear and 2) that would
much more effectively serve the congressional goal of transferring
long-term control to nonprofits.
Ideally, Congress would go even further than merely strengthening
the terms of the safe harbor — for example, making it mandatory that
in nonprofit-developed LIHTC projects, nonprofit general partners
shall be given a purchase option at the end of the initial compliance
period. The notion that nonprofit developers should hold backend
purchase rights in all such deals is not unprecedented. An IRS memo
describing the standards for obtaining 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status for
entities intending to further their charitable purposes by serving as
nonprofit general partners in LIHTC transactions included in its
approval requirements that “[t]he applicant must secure a right of first
refusal to acquire the project at the end of the LIHTC compliance
period.”88 Amending Section 42 to make the provision of a purchase
option a mandatory requirement in nonprofit-sponsored developments
would ensure that this term would be included in all such LIHTC deals.
This rule might marginally affect investor pricing of deals — but the
LIHTC industry has enjoyed a robust market for tax credits for
decades, even when investor prospectus documents assumed limited
backend profits.89 Again, this amendment would serve to filter out
those investors not interested in furthering the congressional goal of

LIHTCs to available LIHTCs. See Michael Novogradac, In Demand: Allocation
Ratios Show Strong Interest in LIHTCs, NOVOGRADAC (Mar. 3, 2014, 12:00 AM),
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/demand-allocation-ratios-showstrong-interest-lihtcs [https://perma.cc/6WAB-W94Q] (noting that the data may
undercount true demand given that some developers may not submit an application
for LIHTCs given high levels of perceived competition). Regarding investor pricing,
investors currently pay from the high $.90s to $1.00 per $1.00 of tax credit. See H. Blair
Kincer & Mark O’Meara, A Look at the LIHTC: Past Pricing Trends, the Current
Market and Future Concerns, 11 NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS, no. 3, Mar. 2020, at 3.
As recently as 2016, investors were paying more than $1.05 per $1.00 of tax credit given
the other benefits, including Community Reinvestment Act credit, an attendant to
LIHTC investments. Id. at 2. See also supra note 21 regarding the financial benefits of
LIHTCs to investors and the relevance of the Community Reinvestment Act.
87. Under current law, investors can shield themselves behind the argument that
granting a purchase option might jeopardize their ability to claim the tax credits.
88. See Memorandum from Robert S. Choi, Dir. of EO Rulings and Agreements
to Internal Revenue Serv., Dep’t of Treasury 3 (July 30, 2007),
https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/choi_memo_073007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZF8R-2FMB].
89. See supra note 86.
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transferring control of the project to nonprofits at the end of the initial
use restriction period.
Retrospectively, attempting to address the ROFR problem in
preexisting partnerships — where a tax credit partnership has already
granted a ROFR with a below-market purchase price to the nonprofit
general partner — is a more delicate issue. At a minimum, Congress
could provide rules of interpretation for use where the agreement
between the parties is silent as to the key terms regularly in dispute —
for example, whether owner/investor willingness to sell is required and
whether a triggering offer must be from an unrelated third-party.
Investors have attempted to cast such clarifying efforts as retroactive
changes to program rules, claiming they constitute an uncompensated
taking of private property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause.90 Query, however, whether a takings challenge under
a Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York style analysis
would succeed.91 Certainly, for the many partnerships that have not
yet been taken over by an aggregator, it would seem difficult for
original investors whose projections forecast little to no backend gain
to now claim that such rules of interpretation would interfere with their
“distinct investment-backed expectations.”92
B. State Level

In conjunction with such federal efforts, states can also play an
important role in addressing the ROFR problem. This is particularly
true prior to the enactment of any federal legislation or if Congress
enacts a fix that is limited to clarifying the safe harbor rather than
making a purchase option mandatory. State governments create the
rules used to determine which LIHTC applications receive an award of

90. See Jeffrey M. Harris, An Unconstitutional Attempt to Address Affordable
Housing, 20 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 168, 177 (2019) (arguing that Section 303 of the
Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2019 would have worked a taking of
limited partner investor interests in LIHTC partnerships).
91. See 438 U.S. 104, 105 (1978) (noting, among other factors relevant to takings
analysis, whether government action sufficiently frustrates “distinct investmentbacked expectations”).
92. Id. For those interests that have been taken over by an aggregator, courts may
need to determine the degree to which all investment-backed expectations — even
those that run clearly counter to public policy — are treated as of equal weight. More
generally, original investors and aggregators would carry the burden of trying to
convince a court that a property right is infringed upon where Congress simply clarifies
rules of interpretation to be used in the absence of explicit contract terms to the
contrary.
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tax credits.93 Section 42 requires that these rules be set forth in a
“qualified allocation plan” (QAP) adopted by the state.94
States should amend their QAPs to help address the ROFR
problem. In nonprofit-sponsored deals, states should require that
nonprofit general partners be given backend purchase rights as a
prerequisite for receiving an award of tax credits.95 Cautious states
may start with a ROFR requirement and consider making a pure
purchase option requirement contingent upon a change to Section 42
that ensures safe harbor protection for such options.96 Jurisdictions
that adopt this approach should clearly define the requisite conditions
precedent for the nonprofit to exercise its ROFR.97
The Washington State Housing Finance Commission has gone even
further, proposing a change to its compliance manual that would
require agency consent to certain limited partner interest transfers.98
Other best practices might include limiting future program
participation by investors who dispute nonprofit purchase rights. The
National Preservation Working Group, an association with the purpose
of preserving the affordability of low-income housing, is working with
certain state housing finance agencies to incorporate such best
practices into their QAPs.99 Because the ROFR problem can arise in

93. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1).
94. Id.
95. See Lauren Loney & Heather Way, Strategies and Tools for Preserving Low
Income Housing Tax Credit Properties, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L.
255, 276–77 (2019) (suggesting that “[s]tates and cities can improve preservationoriented organizations’ ability to preserve LIHTC properties by adopting stronger
ROFR and purchase-option polices for qualified nonprofit entities”).
96. The New York City Department of Housing Preservation & Development,
which is a unique local jurisdiction that allocates a portion of New York State’s LIHTC
allotment, has incorporated this contingency approach in its 2021 draft QAP. See 2021
Draft Qualified Allocation Plan, N.Y.C. (N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., Draft,
2021), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/services/2021-draft-qualifiedallocation-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJK5-G3S7].
97. For example, New York City has required in its draft QAP that nonprofit
applicants for tax credits must submit a letter of intent between the LIHTC partners
demonstrating that a qualified nonprofit shall be given a ROFR that can be exercised
without limited partner consent “following the General Partner’s receipt of a bona fide
third party offer to purchase the project.” Id.
98. See Proposed Revisions to the Chapter 9 Property Transfers Policy for the 2020
Program Year, WASH. ST. HOUS. FIN. COMM’N, http://wshfc.org/managers/policy.htm
[https://perma.cc/JHS9-KJ7D] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
99. Massachusetts, Washington, Virginia, Washington D.C., and New York City
are among the jurisdictions already considering policy fixes to the ROFR problem.
Robert Rozen, Comments to the National Preservation Working Group (July 19,
2021); see also NAT’L HOUS. TR., LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT (LIHTC)
RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL (ROFR) TACTICAL TOOLKIT FOR STATE AND LOCAL
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any state, all 50 state housing finance agencies would be wise to join
such efforts to help secure long-term affordability of their LIHTC
housing stock. Given the growing nature of this problem, states must
be proactive to stem the tide.
CONCLUSION

Unlike Opportunity Zones, a tax break designed to benefit wealthy
investors based on fundamentally flawed theoretical grounds, the
LIHTC program plays an important role in improving the lives of
millions of low-income U.S. households through the provision of
decent, affordable housing. LIHTC housing developed by nonprofit
developers is of particular value given, among other benefits, their
much greater likelihood of preserving long-term affordability.
Investor efforts to thwart the ability of nonprofit developers to
acquire LIHTC properties upon the expiration of use restrictions
threaten the ongoing viability of this stock of housing as an important
resource for low-income families. This vulnerability of the program
arises as an artifact of an attempt to harmonize Section 42 with general
tax policy principles that are ill suited in the context of a LIHTC real
estate transaction. Broader theoretical fixes that more clearly place
long-term project control in the hands of public-oriented stakeholders
are conceivable but, at least at the moment, not politically viable.
As such, the Biden Administration should prioritize working with
Congress to enact a legislative fix to Section 42 that not only clarifies
the safe harbor, but also ensures that nonprofits are given a purchase
option in all nonprofit-sponsored LIHTC deals. States meanwhile
should amend their credit allocation rules to award credits more
selectively to projects with clear mechanisms for preserving long-term
control. Unlike the Opportunity Zone program, such interventions at
the federal and state levels would be certain to have an immediate and
positive impact on the lives of low-income U.S. households.

ALLOCATING AGENCIES 1 (2021) (recommending other best practices for states,
including conducting early outreach to nonprofit to prepare for Year 15, educating
general partners early about their ROFR rights, and helping to create an entity that
could make ROFR-triggering offers).

